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Prior research has suggested that many older Americans have not saved enough to 
maintain consumption levels in old age. One way older persons might respond to 
inadequate savings would be to extend their worklives by delaying retirement. This paper 
examines evidence on this matter using the Health and Retirement Study, a nationally 
representative panel survey of people age 51-61 in 1992 followed for several years in a 
panel. We use the data to project household retirement assets and to determine how much 
more saving would be needed to preserve post-retirement consumption levels.  Our 
research then examines the links between derived saving shortfall measures and delayed 
retirement patterns. Among nonmarried persons, there is evidence that larger shortfalls do 
produce delayed retirement, though the effect is not quantitatively large. For married 
couples, pre-retirement wealth shortfalls do not appear to be significantly associated with 
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Much has been written in the economics literature about the determinants of household 
wealth accumulation, particularly regarding the question of whether households save adequately 
for their retirement.
1  In this paper, we measure and link the extent of retirement shortfalls to the 
decision to delay retirement. In particular, we ask whether older households which appear to lack 
the wealth to retire at a given age actually extend their working lives, so as to more readily pay 
for an adequate retirement income. Evidence on retirement wealth adequacy is of particular 
interest given the rapidly aging workforce and the expectation that Social Security faces financial 
insolvency.  
  There are various benchmarks against which household wealth levels might be compared, 
to determine retirement saving adequacy. One is derived from a structural model of lifecycle 
utility maximization which generates estimates of projects saving shortfalls. For example, over a 
decade ago Bernheim (1992) used dynamic programming to solve for optimal asset accumulation 
patterns. At that time, his data indicated that households age 35-45 accumulated assets at only 
one-third the rate of what was needed to maintain consumption levels during retirement; overall, 
Bernheim reported saving shortfalls averaging 9-19 percent per year. Other research in the field 
has reached more optimistic conclusions, including Sabelhaus and Manchester (1995) who noted 
that baby boomers were accumulating more assets than their parents, even though their 
consumption patterns appeared similar. Using a newer dataset, Engen et al. (2004) also adopt a 
life cycle model and found smaller saving shortfalls among older households than did Bernheim 
                                                 
1 Older studies in this vein include Kotlikoff et al. (1982); Bernheim (1988); and many others 
reviewed in Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999).  A spate of recent studies includes work by Aguiar 
and Hurst (2004); Banks et al. (1998); Engen and Gale (1999); Engen et al. (2004); Haider and 
Stephens (2004); Hurd and Rohwedder (2003); Hurst (2004); Mitchell and Moore (1998); Moore 
and Mitchell (2000); and Scholz et al. (2003).  
 in the earlier surveys. A recent study by Scholz et al. (2003) elaborates the life cycle model to 
incorporate additional sources of uncertainty including medical costs. Again using recent data, 
that study did document some saving shortfalls, although for most American households 
retirement assets appeared adequate.   
  This literature comes to somewhat disparate conclusions regarding the shortfalls issue for 
a variety of reasons. One is the fact that these studies differ with regard to how they model 
workers’ preferences for leisure and purchased goods. A second is that some authors exclude 
from consideration important components of retiree wealth such as net housing equity (and 
sometimes Social Security or pensions). A third difference stems from the use of different 
benchmarks as a “baseline” for consumption-smoothing. In general, studies that take lifetime 
earnings as the benchmark tend to find better adequacy rates than do studies which focus on pre-
retirement earnings as the target for replacement.  Which is the most appropriate level is, of 
course, unclear on a priori grounds.  
A different approach is adopted by Mitchell and Moore (1998) and Moore and Mitchell 
(2000; hereafter MM), an approach that we extend in the present paper.  That methodology 
builds on a financial planning approach, where a “replacement rate” consumption target is 
converted into a consumption-smoothing path consistent with a life cycle model.  It is worth 
noting that most financial advisers adopt a pre-specified replacement rate, for instance proposing 
that households should have assets sufficient to generate lifetime annual income worth 75% of 
pre-retirement pay in order to avoid a shortfall.
2   By contrast, MM solve for an endogenous 
replacement rate endogenously, one which derives from the hypothesis that forward-looking 
                                                 
2 Alternative computations adjust retirement consumption to exclude work-related expenses and 
to account for differential taxation of workers versus retirees (for a good discussion see McGill 
et al. 2004). 
 households seek to maintain equal real, after-tax, after-saving, levels of pre- and post- retirement 
consumption.  In this framework, a household’s target replacement rate is determined as a 
function of household earnings and current wealth, as well as demographic information. The 
earlier MM results indicated that the median US household on the verge of retirement would 
need to save substantially more in order to retire at 62, though this rate is approximately halved if 
retirement were delayed to age 65. That research also found that saving shortfalls declined 
empirically as assets rose, but high earners had substantial undersaving. 
In the present context, we posit that a household could respond to prospective retirement 
saving shortfalls in several ways.  For example, imagine that a worker planned to retire at age 62, 
but sometime in his 50’s, he determined that he had not saved enough to provide for a smooth 
consumption path in retirement.  One response might be to stick with the target retirement age 
but save more, a strategy that would require consumption cuts and increased work effort.  
Another response might be for the older worker to plan on cutting post-retirement consumption.
3 
Yet a third possibility might be to work longer, and indeed most people retiring at age 62 are 
apparently in good enough health to do so.
4  Further, the results from MM suggest that delaying 
retirement can substantially reduce the savings shortfalls.   
                                                 
3 Some evidence does suggest that older workers do anticipate reducing consumption after 
retiring (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003); on the other hand, Agiar and Hurst (2004) find that 
expenditures fall after retirement but consumption does not, due to increases in home production.   
4 That is, most HRS respondents retiring around age 62 do not report having work-limiting health 
problems. Burkhauser et. al (1996) first examined the health and economic circumstances of 
early Social Security beneficiaries, analysis extended by Mitchell and Phillips (2000) who use 
four waves of HRS data and consider a broader set of health measures.  Both studies find that the 
majority of early retirees report themselves in good health. 
 In what follows, we relate projected retirement savings shortfalls to observed retirement 
behavior in the HRS, to evaluate their association.
5  We begin by assessing the claim that 
Americans undersave for retirement by examining the Health and Retirement Study, which 
contains exceptionally complete information on household wealth linked to administrative 
records on earnings and benefits from Social Security, including information on financial wealth, 
net home equity, and retirement pension wealth. With these data, we project and evaluate 
household retirement wealth, which we then compare to the level of retirement assets needed to 
smooth real consumption levels over the retirement period.  We use this information to calculate 
the additional amount of annual earnings that would have to be saved to achieve consumption 
smoothing by the age of retirement. Finally we relate these shortfall measures to the probability 
of working at ages 62 and 65. 
 
Data and Methods 
    Health and Retirement Study (HRS) respondents were first interviewed in 1992 at age 
51-61 (along with spouses of any age); additional surveys have been administered every two 
years thereafter.
6  In the HRS, retirement assets may be divided into three categories:
 
1.  Financial wealth: business assets, financial assets (such as stocks, bonds, and bank 
accounts less outstanding debt), dedicated retirement assets including IRA and Keogh 
Accounts, and miscellaneous other financial assets;  
                                                 
5 Our research is therefore similar in spirit to previous work (Bernheim 1988) which relied on the 
older Retirement History Survey (RHS) but did not use shortfall measures as we have done here. 
6 The present study uses all waves from 1992-2002; the 2004 data are not yet publicly available.  
Many of our analysis variables come from the Rand HRS, a user-friendly version of the HRS 
produced by the Rand Corporation with financial support from the National Institute on Aging 
and the Social Security Administration and technical support from the HRS staff at the Institute 
for Social Research.  For more information, see http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/data/index.html. 
 2.  Net home equity for homeowners: the market value of owner-occupied housing less 
outstanding mortgage debt; 
3.  Retirement pension wealth: equal to the actuarial present value of future social security 
retirement and survivor benefits and employer pension benefits.
7  
To derive the retirement saving shortfall measures, we use the HRS asset information to derive 
two values (as per MM): each household’s projected shortfall for retirement at 62, and also at 
age 65.
8  The replacement rate equation sets net (after-tax) income pre-retirement equal to net 
income post-retirement.  This may be expressed as: 
(1)   YP - TP – S = YF – TF, 
where income (Y), taxes (T) and saving (S) are considered both before retirement (P) and post 
retirement (F).   
    Equation (1) can be rearranged and written in terms of a consumption smoothing 
replacement rate (RR) by dividing through by pre-retirement income and expressing savings as a 
proportion of pre-retirement income to generate equation (2). 
(2)    
    Using an annuity factor (AF) we convert the future income stream to the level of wealth 
required to sustain YF.
9  If a household’s projected assets (PROJ) are less than their needs, they 
                                                 
7 For detail on how these values are derived using linked data on company pensions and Social 
Security administrative records, see Gustman et al. (1999). The entire value of home equity is 
included in these measures, though we recognize that there is some controversy about whether 
the entire home asset should be counted. For instance Venti and Wise (2001) find that income-
poor but house-rich older families are more likely to reduce equity when they move, while 
house-poor but income-rich households tend to increase housing equity. 
8 Both measures are computed here using pre-retirement pay as the benchmark; see Appendix for 
a discussion of why using average lifetime pay as the benchmark is problematic. 
9 Annuity factors are calculated using the same assumptions used to calculate the value of Social 
Security wealth and rely on the intermediate assumptions used by the Social Security 












 need to save the difference between the current period and their retirement age.  The difference 
can be defined as: 
(3)   AF * YF - PROJ = AF*[YP *(1-s)– TP + TF] – PROJ. 
    Given the difference between projected and adequate level of assets and the number of 
years to retirement, we can calculate the percentage of earnings that must be saved in each year 
leading to retirement to meet the adequate level of assets.
10  We solve for saving and replacement 
rates simultaneously using an iterative approach.  The approach selects an initial replacement 
rate target and then solves for the target wealth level needed to finance this goal, allowing for 
differential taxation prior to retirement and during retirement.  If household assets would be 
projected to fall short relative to target assets, the method derives the shortfall saving rate, which 
                                                 
10 As mentioned in the text, one explanation for the disparate conclusions reached by prior 
studies in the savings adequacy literature is that each employs different benchmarks.  For 
instance, some studies, including ours, focuses on replacing a portion of pre-retirement earnings, 
while others focus on replacing a portion lifetime earnings.  A lifetime earnings benchmark is not 
used because of the data and assumptions required to modify the earnings benchmark. The 
identification of the prescribed savings rate in MM relies on the following equation: 
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where the left hand side of the equation is the amount of wealth that must be accumulated to 
reach the specified benchmark by retirement, the right hand side is the wealth accumulation 
process from the current period to retirement, wg is an assumed wage growth, and r is an 
assumed rate of return on savings.  A key to this strategy is the fact that pre-retirement prescribed 
savings rate appears on both the left and right hand sides of the equality, so we can solve for the 
savings rate as a function of pre-determined arguments.  This strategy breaks down when we 
substitute in the lifetime earnings benchmark.  If we set average post-tax and post-savings 
lifetime earnings as the benchmark, then the above equation is modified to: 
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where Y  is average lifetime earnings, T is average lifetime taxes, and s’ is defined as the 
proportion of average lifetime income that is saved, not as a proportion of pre-retirement income 
as it is defined in the previous equation.  The prescribed savings rate, s, is no longer identified as 
a function of pre-determined arguments unless.  In order to define s’ we would need information 
on savings historic savings patterns (which we do not observe in the data) or exogenously 
identify s’ under a host of assumptions.  For these reasons, in the present analysis we limit our 
analysis to the benchmark that focuses on pre-retirement earnings. 
 is equal to the additional fraction of earnings that would have to be saved, to reach the 
consumption-smoothing goal. This new rate is then used to compute a new replacement rate: if 
the saving rate is unfeasibly high, the replacement rate is lowered; conversely, the prescribed 
replacement rate is increased if the saving rate proves below that required for consumption, taxes, 
and saving to sum to pre-retirement income.  The process is repeated until the prescribed saving 
and replacement rates converge.   
    In the analysis to follow, we express shortfalls as percentage measures: that is, they refer 
to the additional fraction of pre-tax earnings that each household would have to save prior to 
retirement to smooth consumption over the remaining lifetime (hereafter “shortfall”).
11  
  The next issue to which we turn is an examination of how these saving shortfalls might 
influence subsequent work and retirement behavior. In practice, there are many different ways to 
calibrate and quantify retirement behavior at older ages (c.f. Lumsdaine and Mitchell 1999; 
Gustman et al., 1995; Gustman and Steinmeier 2000).  In the present analysis, we focus on two 
objectively measured and clearly work-related outcomes, namely, whether respondents reported 
themselves as working for pay at age 62 and also at age 65.
12  For the first analysis sample, we 
select all respondents who attained at least age 62 by 2002, the last year of publicly available 
HRS dataset. For the second analysis, the sample includes only those who attained at least age 65 
by 2002.  Selecting our samples in this way avoids incomplete spells due to sample censoring.  
Both samples include only respondents who initially reported themselves as working for pay at 
baseline, in 1992. 
                                                 
11 These computations take into account the household’s tax status and life expectancy as of 
retirement age, using appropriate annuity factors and tax schedules in place at the time of the 
initial baseline; see Moore and Mitchell (2000). 
12 We have also examined alternative definitions of retirement, including whether or not the 
respondent had positive earnings; results were qualitatively similar to those reported below. 
     The specific estimating equations we evaluate focus on Prob(Work|a), defined as the 
probability of working at age a, which equals 1 if the individual reported himself as working at 
the time of the survey and 0 otherwise: 
(4)   Prob(Work|a) = f [Shortfall, X1, X2, X3 ].  
Our canonical regressions include the household’s computed shortfall measured in three 
alternative ways.  The first two refer to the shortfalls associated with retirement at a particular 
age (for age 62, SAVE62, and for age 65, SAVE65); these appear only in the equations relating to 
work at age 62 and 65 respectively.  We also calculate SAVEDIFF which is change in the 
shortfall if the respondent were to work from age 62 to 65; this is included as a control in some 
of the specifications for work at age 62.   
    The estimated coefficients from these variables help test the following hypotheses:  
1.  The probability of working at age 62 (or 65) is positively correlated with shortfalls (i.e., 
estimated coefficients >0 for SAVE62 and SAVE65). 
2.  The probability of working at age 62 is positively correlated with returns for working 
longer (i.e. estimated coefficient >0 for SAVEDIFF). 
We also include a vector of standard socioeconomic variables (X1) all measured at the 1992 
baseline wave of the survey, including the respondent’s educational attainment, marital status, 
number of children, race/ethnicity, and health.  
    Additional analysis adopts more complete specifications that add some less conventional 
variables to the canonical set: 
•  X2 includes an indicator of the respondent’s reported financial planning horizon and a 
baseline indicator of the respondent’s expectation of consumption declines in retirement. 
 •  X3 includes indicators of health and marital shocks, indicating whether he experienced a 
change in health, or became a widow/er since the baseline interview. 
The empirical models are carried out separately for nonmarried versus married respondents.  In 
the married respondent equations, we include controls for characteristics of their spouses.
13 (A 
complete variable list appears in Appendix Table 1.) 
 
Empirical Results 
    A graphical depiction of the distribution of shortfalls for our sample appears in Figure 1, 
for both age 62 and 65 retirement.
14  The perpendicular line through the middle of both panels 
marks the zero shortfall point:  the density to the left of the line indicates households who have 
saved enough to meet their retirement needs, while the opposite is true for households to the 
right of the line.  Note that for both age 62 and 65 retirements, the distribution of shortfalls is 
skewed.  Some households have saved considerable wealth relative to their needs (depicted by 
the relatively long left tail in each panel in Figure 1), but the majority of households fall to the 
right side of the distribution, indicating undersaving relative to consumption needs.   It is also 
worth note that delaying retirement shifts more of the distribution to the left of the zero shortfall 
line and reduces the median shortfall: delaying retirement both eliminates and reduces shortfalls 
for many households.  However, even with a delay in retirement, many households still 
experience shortfalls.   
Figure 1 here  
                                                 
13 Since married age-eligible respondents appear twice in the data, standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering in the married respondent specifications. 
14 We used the kernel density estimation available in STATA 8 SE.  Weighting for the density 
estimate was produced with a Gaussian kernel and an optimally selected width.  
   The  overall  distribution  of  shortfalls  hides considerable dispersion across groups by 
marital status, wealth and earnings as indicated in Table 1. The first panel reports saving rates 
required to smooth consumption, provided separately for married and nonmarried households 
and arrayed by wealth quintile.
15  The results show that the median married household on the 
verge of retirement in the HRS, at around age 56, would need to save 17 percentage points more 
of its current earnings to smooth consumption if retirement were to take place at age 62.  The 
shortfall for the median married household is reduced by 40%, to only 10 percentage points, if 
retirement were postponed to age 65. For nonmarried individuals, the median shortfall for age-62 
retirement is larger (24% of earnings) than for married households, but here, the gap can be more 
than halved by delaying retirement to age 65.
16  Not surprisingly, shortfalls across the wealth 
distribution are uneven: the top wealth quintile already has enough to finance smooth 
consumption, while the poorest quintile faces the largest shortfalls. In the second panel, we array 
shortfalls by household earnings quintiles.  Here the medians are similar: married couples would 
need to save 17% more per year if they intended to retire at age 62, but only about half that much 
for retirement at age 65; nonmarried respondents have higher needs. It is also of interest to note 
that many low earners actually have negative shortfalls; that is, their combined assets and 
retirement benefits are already sufficient to consumption-smooth.  By contrast, many higher 
earners can anticipate higher shortfalls, because they need to save more to maintain their high 
incomes into retirement.  
Table 1 here 
                                                 
15 Values of baseline wealth quintiles are given in $2003, where values include net financial 
wealth, net home equity, and retirement wealth. 
16 These shortfall figures are somewhat higher than those reported in MM (2000) due to fact that 
here we use a slightly older sample (age 52+) in order to ensure that there is no age-based 
censoring of the dependent variables used below. 
   Next, we turn to an examination of the association between estimated shortfalls and the 
probability of working at age 62 and age 65. Here the dependent variable is set to one if a 
respondent reported himself as working when surveyed at that age, and zero otherwise.  Since 
the dependent variable is measured at the time the respondent was age 62 (or 65), the sample size 
depends on how many respondents were of the proper age for the measure in question.   Our 
hypothesis regarding a relationship between shortfalls and work is predicated on the hypothesis 
that households consider their wealth needs and plan their retirement accordingly.   
    Before summarizing the econometric results, a glance on Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between respondents’ actual work patterns to their ex-ante self-reports of the probability that 
they will be working at later ages (an assessment offered at baseline).  In the top panel, we  
compares projected and actual probabilities of working at age 62 and 65 for nonmarried 
respondents, while the bottom panel depicts the same variables for married respondents.  It is 
interesting that ex-ante work probabilities offered by nonmarried persons do a remarkably good 
job of tracking their ex-post work probabilities at age 62, implying that age 62 work expectations 
are typically met for nonmarried respondents. At age 65, the difference between ex-ante and ex-
post work probabilities for nonmarrieds is about -5 percentage points, indicating if anything 
some earlier than expected retirement for this population.  By contrast, the pattern is the opposite 
for the married groups, though the differences between the ex-ante versus the ex-post work 
probabilities are less than 5 percentage points.  In any event, married respondents appear to 
slightly understate their probability of actually working at both ages, thought the effect is small. 
In sum, Figure 2 suggests that most peoples’ expectations regarding work in later life turn out to 
be realized, at least for HRS respondents: that is, most people stick to their retirement plans. 
Figure 2 here 
     To further analyze the relationship between shortfalls and delayed retirement, next we 
link the empirically observed probabilities of work at older ages to the household’s computed 
shortfall measures. Three specifications are evaluated for both nonmarried and married 
households.  In the first, we use only the relevant shortfall measure and include controls for 
socioeconomic variables (X1) for respondents (as well as spouses, where relevant). In the second, 
we add variables indicating each respondent’s reported financial planning horizon and a baseline 
indicator of his expectation of consumption declines in retirement (X2).  Finally, in our third 
specification, we add some controls for “shock” variables, which are indicators of health and 
marital changes experienced since the baseline interview.
17   
  Results for the nonmarried respondents are provided in Table 2 and for married 
respondents in Table 3.  For the nonmarried individuals, the first three columns describes results 
for the probability of working at age 62 (the second set focuses on work at 65); each of the three 
columns represents one of the three specifications described earlier. That is, X1 is the canonical 
specification which includes only the shortfall and socioeconomic variables; in turn, the later 
columns add X2 (planning and consumption expectation variables), and X3 adds shock variables.   
Table 2 here 
The results show that all three specifications, and for both work at both ages 62 and 65, 
larger shortfalls are positively and statistically significantly associated with delayed retirement. 
Furthermore, this group is more likely to continue working at older ages if, by doing so, they 
close more of the shortfall gap (Savediff). Both findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
older workers respond by working additional years when retirement assets are insufficient.  
Coefficients for education and health in the canonical specification (X1) also have the expected 
                                                 
17 Variable definitions appear in Appendix Table 1 and summary statistics appear in Appendix 
Table 2. 
 signs: that is, respondents who are healthy, well-educated, and who anticipate living to age 75 
with high probability all work longer.  Those who were divorced prior to 1992 are also more 
likely to work at both age 62 and 65. Being widowed has differential impacts depending on when 
it happens: widowhood prior to 1992 reduces the likelihood of working beyond age 62, but 
people who are widowed in their 50s appear more likely to work to age 65. 
  Another interesting finding is that our enriched specification (which includes the X2 
vector) produces many statistically significant variables. Thus respondents who say they have 
relatively long financial planning horizons are also likely to work more at both ages 62 and 65.  
By contrast, the effect of expected consumption declines in retirement have different 
relationships with work at age 62 and 65.  Expecting to consume less in retirement is positively 
correlated with  more work at age 62, but the relationship turns negative for work at age 65.  One 
possible explanation for this finding is that the returns to consumption of working longer 
diminish with age, such that delaying retirement leisure after age 65 is felt to be economically 
‘not worth it’. 
  In the third specification we add health and widowhood shock variables to the equation 
(X3).  For both the age 62 and 65 work equations, these new variables are both statistically 
significant and have the expected signs: shocks are correlated with lower probabilities of work.  
Again, the shortfall variables maintain their sign and significance.  For the nonmarried sample, 
higher shortfalls are associated with higher work probabilities. 
Results for married respondents appear on Table 3, with the first panel focusing on work 
at age 62 and the second, age 65. The contrast with nonmarried respondents is stark: few 
variables are significant and this includes the shortfall variables.  Some variables such as 
education and health shocks do tend to be statistically significant and have the expected signs, 
 but these are the exceptions. In all, relatively few of the remaining variables in Table 3 are 
significant across specifications for the married sample. 
Table 3 here 
The results from Tables 2 and 3 are reduced form in nature, so they cannot directly 
identify causal relationships in the work/saving nexus. Yet they do suggest that the hypothesis of 
a positive empirical link between shortfalls and delayed retirement can only be accepted for the 
sample of nonmarried respondents.  This may be due to the fact that married couples can adjust 
along a number of margins as described by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), including more work by 
other family members, small reductions in expenditures by more members, and the like.  
We also find that the effects of shortfalls on retirement among nonmarried respondents is 
rather small quantitatively.  Figure 3 provides predicted probabilities of work at age 62 and 65 
for nonmarried respondents, assuming both zero and median levels of retirement shortfalls.  
What the results show is that the coefficients for SAVE62, SAVE65, and SAVEDIFF are all 
highly significant, but their magnitudes are quite small: predicted percentage changes are all less 
than 1 percent across specifications.  Therefore, while a relationship between shortfalls and work 
exists, the magnitude of the effect appears to be quite small. Evidently people facing retirement 
saving shortfalls do not appear to delay retirement much; rather, they are likely to adapt to 
shortfalls along other dimensions. Additional research on consumption changes and possibly 
unretirement patterns would likely be valuable in examining these issues further. 
 
Conclusions and Future Research  
  This paper explores links between retirement saving shortfalls and work at older ages 
using the Health and Retirement Study, a nationally representative survey of older Americans on 
 the verge of retirement.  The results show that the median older US household will be unable to 
maintain levels of pre-retirement consumption into retirement without additional saving, though 
delaying retirement by only three years would cut the saving burden by roughly half. We also 
find that saving shortfalls are distributed unevenly across the older population, such that those 
with the highest earnings categories are also those with the largest shortfalls. When we link our 
measures of shortfalls to the likelihood of working at older ages, we find that nonmarried 
households who face substantial saving shortfalls do tend to work somewhat longer. The 
estimates are robust to controls on a host of other factors, though the magnitude of the estimated 
effects is quantitatively small.  Among married couples, we find no statistically significant 
relationship between shortfalls and work. One reason for the difference in results for the married 
and nonmarried samples may be that two earners can each work a bit longer, or consume a bit 
less, whereas nonmarried persons must bear the burden of the entire shortfall alone.   
  Though the current literature is, to some degree, divided on the extent of saving adequacy 
among near-retirees, our results suggest that individuals do respond rationally to saving shortfalls 
by extending their worklives and reducing the period they will spend in retirement.  Future 
research can take into account differences in respondent knowledge regarding their anticipated 
retirement benefits (cf Gustman and Steinmeir, 2001a and b).   
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Table 1: Saving Shortfalls by Wealth and Income Quintiles 
 


























Rate to Age 
65 (%) 
Married    Married 
1  $207,432 31        
            
                
            
             
         
            
                
            
             
       
           
       
22 1  $12,066 -60 -67
2  $369,398 22 13 2  $31,475 8 -1
3 $539,739 17 10 3 $49,049 17 9
4  $813,367 7 0 4  $68,197 18 10
5  $1,431,411 -14 -22 5  $108,459 20 13
Nonmarried 
 
  Nonmarried 
  1  $64,433 38 27 1  $5,246 -19 -29
2  $119,593 33 21 2  $15,738 23 10
3 $207,249 24 10 3 $24,918 28 14
4  $357,575 10 -4 4  $35,410 19 4
5  $696,247 -6 -25 5 
 
$59,016 14 -2
   
Total  $506,668
 





   
Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS in $2003.Table 2: Factors Associated with Probability of Working at Age 62 and 65: 
Nonmarried Sample 
P(Work | 62)  P(Work | 65)  Variable Name 
X1 X1,X2 X1,X2,X3 X1 X1,X2 X1,X2,X3
SAVE  0.00420**  0.00451** 0.00434** 0.00188** 0.00239** 0.00157** 
   [0.00008]  [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00007] 
SAVEDIFF  0.01210** 0.01291**  0.00332**   --   --   -- 
   [0.00059] [0.00059]  [0.00061]   --   --   -- 
Less than HS  -0.08602**  -0.08437** -0.07008** -0.03725** -0.04107** -0.00947** 
   [0.00094]  [0.00095] [0.00099] [0.00084] [0.00083] [0.00081] 
More than HS  0.04024**  0.03380** 0.03665** 0.00705** 0.00623**  -0.01585** 
   [0.00075]  [0.00076] [0.00080] [0.00070] [0.00071] [0.00064] 
Divorce  0.03929**  0.03589** 0.01748** 0.01314** 0.01755**  0.000 
   [0.00078]  [0.00078] [0.00082] [0.00073] [0.00074] [0.00068] 
Widow  -0.00957** -0.01030**  -0.06647** 0.06367** 0.06530** 0.00238** 
   [0.00086]  [0.00086] [0.00090] [0.00083] [0.00083] [0.00072] 
Children  0.00207**  0.00285** 0.01452** 0.00063**  0.000  0.00851** 
   [0.00019]  [0.00020] [0.00021] [0.00018] [0.00018] [0.00016] 
Black  -0.00384**  0.001  0.01750** 0.01544** 0.01949** 0.01530** 
   [0.00091]  [0.00091] [0.00095] [0.00086] [0.00087] [0.00081] 
Hispanic  0.07129** 0.08217**  0.08638**  -0.04569**  -0.04361**  0.001 
   [0.00149]  [0.00149] [0.00159] [0.00144] [0.00146] [0.00151] 
Any ADL  -0.06359** -0.05910** 0.03734** -0.14533** -0.14594**  -0.09290** 
   [0.00147]  [0.00148] [0.00160] [0.00097] [0.00097] [0.00094] 
Subj. Prob 
(Live to 75)  0.09461**  0.08529** 0.05194** 0.07827** 0.07089** 0.04227** 
   [0.00115]  [0.00116] [0.00122] [0.00110] [0.00111] [0.00102] 
Female  0.14073**  0.14525** 0.12636** 0.05678** 0.05959** 0.00761** 
   [0.00072]  [0.00073] [0.00076] [0.00067] [0.00067] [0.00064] 
Consume Less     0.00851**  0.02023**    -0.04133**  -0.00764** 
      [0.00072]  [0.00076]    [0.00066]  [0.00061] 
Long Plan     0.06080**  0.05114**    0.01103**  0.00201** 
      [0.00069]  [0.00073]    [0.00066]  [0.00059] 
Health Shock       -0.25951**       -0.13366** 
        [0.00078]       [0.00054] 
Widow Shock       -0.50633**       -0.19731** 
        [0.00080]       [0.00052] 
Observations  947  947 947 787 787 787 
Log  Likelihood  -1618644.2  -1614687.9 -1473169.9 -1084108.9 -1080838.1  -908744.3 
Note: Estimates are Probit marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 5% level; ** 
significant at 1% level. Also included are missing data flags for all right-hand side variables. 
Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS. 
 Table 3a: Factors Associated with the Probability of Working at Age 62: Married 
Sample 
P(Work | 62) 
X1 X1,X2 X1,X2,X3 Variable Name 
Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse 
SAVE  -0.00566    -0.00389    -0.00496    
   [0.00388]    [0.00390]    [0.00401]    
SAVEDIFF  -0.00126    -0.00177    -0.00956    
   [0.04104]    [0.04074]    [0.04144]    
Less than HS  -0.02758 -0.01263 -0.02436 -0.02026 -0.01971 -0.01706 
   [0.03150] [0.03104] [0.03168] [0.03123] [0.03351] [0.03262] 
More than HS  0.08908** -0.0426 0.09623** -0.0403 0.08223**  -0.04409 
   [0.02354] [0.02396] [0.02356] [0.02401] [0.02423] [0.02463] 
Divorce  -0.01627 -0.02553  -0.0145  -0.03721 -0.02219 -0.03104 
   [0.03161] [0.03254] [0.03177] [0.03272] [0.03227] [0.03330] 
Widow  -0.12138 -0.04282 -0.11063  -0.0641  -0.11125 -0.05599 
   [0.06336] [0.05852] [0.06409] [0.05916] [0.06897] [0.05799] 
Children  0.00137    0.00143    0.00586    
   [0.00573]    [0.00572]    [0.00578]    
Black  -0.04561  0.03097 -0.0698 0.05379  -0.04533 0.0055 
   [0.10362] [0.10235] [0.10213] [0.10050] [0.10129] [0.10050] 
Hispanic  -0.10251 0.09921  -0.1072  0.11079 -0.08967 0.08714 
   [0.07045] [0.07051] [0.07027] [0.06948] [0.07157] [0.07272] 
Any ADL  -0.10065* 0.10982** -0.11495* 0.09979**  -0.05885 0.10531** 
   [0.05079] [0.03769] [0.05088] [0.03773] [0.05556] [0.03913] 
Subj. P(Live to 
75)  0.12343** -0.02429 0.14392** -0.01633  0.10345* -0.02541 
   [0.03832] [0.03827] [0.03861] [0.03854] [0.04034] [0.03936] 
Female  -0.09548**    -0.11888**    -0.12427**    
   [0.02111]    [0.02164]    [0.02221]    
Consume Less        0.05969** 0.02908 0.07972** 0.02541 
         [0.02285] [0.02401] [0.02389] [0.02519] 
Long Plan        -0.04843* -0.00716 -0.04619* -0.00913 
         [0.02148] [0.02147] [0.02214] [0.02214] 
Health Shock           -0.32939**  -0.02244 
            [0.02408]  [0.02988] 
Widow Shock           -0.26899**     
            [0.05631]     
Observations  2900 2900 2900 
Log Likelihood  -4873716.4 -4822156.8 -4514345.4 
Note: Estimates are Probit marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 5% level; ** 
significant at 1% level. Also included are missing data flags for all right-hand side variables. 
Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS. 
  
 Table 3b: Factors Associated with the Probability of Working at Age 65: Married 
Sample 
P(Work | 65) 
X1 X1,X2 X1,X2,X3 Variable Name 
Respondent  Spouse  Respondent Spouse Respondent Spouse 
SAVE  -0.00088     0.00081     -0.00077    
   [0.00303]     [0.00345]     [0.00288]    
Less than HS  -0.01896  -0.00279  -0.01639 -0.00658 -0.01352 -0.01836 
   [0.02698]  [0.02747]  [0.02712] [0.02732] [0.02703] [0.02572] 
More than HS  0.05784** -0.02826 0.05977**  -0.0279  0.05036*  -0.03642 
   [0.02138]  [0.02073]  [0.02135] [0.02063] [0.02100] [0.02008] 
Divorce  0.02423  -0.00514  0.02572 -0.01214 0.02575 -0.00984 
   [0.02799]  [0.02869]  [0.02778] [0.02788] [0.02741] [0.02718] 
Widow  -0.04541 -0.08142* -0.04143 -0.09357** -0.05399 -0.08947** 
   [0.05446]  [0.03835]  [0.05372] [0.03479] [0.04969] [0.03356] 
Children  0.00865     0.00909     0.01104*    
   [0.00524]     [0.00528]     [0.00486]    
Black  -0.03366  0.06651  -0.05918 0.09297 -0.04325 0.06321 
   [0.10498]  [0.13326]  [0.09382] [0.13741] [0.08843] [0.12002] 
Hispanic  -0.11222**  0.18818*  -0.11551** 0.20376* -0.09878** 0.17377* 
   [0.03530]  [0.07924]  [0.03389] [0.08016] [0.03335] [0.07538] 
Any ADL  -0.03493 0.09258*  -0.0441  0.08773*  -0.02201  0.07582 
   [0.04594]  [0.04189]  [0.04394] [0.04081] [0.04508] [0.03891] 
Subj. P(Live to 
75)  0.04787  -0.04804  0.05514 -0.04331 0.02672 -0.04042 
   [0.03410]  [0.03479]  [0.03422] [0.03455] [0.03342] [0.03300] 
Female  -0.05379**     -0.06298**     -0.06104**    
   [0.01835]     [0.01866]     [0.01811]    
Consume Less       0.01098  0.0085  0.01919  0.00966 
         [0.02091] [0.02172] [0.02086] [0.02152] 
Long Plan       -0.03797*  0.00178  -0.02737  0.00077 
         [0.01838] [0.01870] [0.01821] [0.01849] 
Health Shock            -0.13439**  -0.03187 
             [0.01664]  [0.02264] 
Widow Shock            0.06997    
             [0.04952]    
Observations  2425 2425  2425 
Log Likelihood  -2958680.8 -2920246.1  -2802235.2 
Note: Estimates are Probit marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 5% level; ** 
significant at 1% level. Also included are missing data flags for all right-hand side variables. 
Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS. 
 
 Figure 1: Distribution of Shortfalls at Ages 62 and 65 
Source: Authors’ computations using STATA 8.0 SE univariate kernel density estimator (KDENSITY) of 









B. Saving Shortfalls for Retirement at Age 65: 58% have positive shortfall
 Figure 2: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Probability of Work at Ages 62 and 65 
 















































Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS. 
 Figure 3: Effects of Savings Shortfall on the Predicted Probability of Work 
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Shortfall=0, Savediff=0 Shortfall=Median Shortfall, Savediff=Median Savediff  
 





Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Type  Variable Name  Description 
W62PAY  ==1 if R still working at age 62   Dep. 
Variables  W65PAY  ==1 if R still working at age 65 
SAVE62  (saving rate to age 62)*100 
SAVE65  (saving rate to age 65)*100  Shortfalls (X1) 
SAVEDIFF  =(save62)-(save65) 
Less than HS  ==1 if R has less than a high school education 
More than HS  ==1 if R has some college or more education 
Divorce  ==1 if R ever divorced prior to 1992 
Widow  ==1 if R ever widowed prior to 1992 
Children  N children in household in 1992 
Black  ==1 if R Black 
Hispanic  ==1 if R Hispanic 
SES (X1) 
Female  ==1 if R female 
ANYADL  ==1 if R reports trouble with ≥ 1 ADL in 1992  Health (X1) 
P(Live to 75)  R subjective probability of living to age 75 in 1992 
Consume Less  ==1 if R expects a decrease in living standards after 
retirement  Planning (X2) 
Long Plan  ==1 if R reports a long (> 5 yrs) financial planning 
horizon in 1992 
Health Shock 
==1 if R did not report health as work limiting factor 
in 1992, but reported a work limiting health problem 
after 1992 in some year prior to retirement  "Shocks" (X3) 
Widow Shock  ==1 if R widowed after 1992 and before the wave 
that retirement 
Notes: In married regressions, equivalent variables used for spouses.  
 
Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS.  Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics for Unmarried Respondents by Analysis Sample 
 
 
P(Work | 62) Sample  P(Work | 65) Sample  Variable Type  Variable Name 
Mean  Std. Dev  % Missing  Mean  Std. Dev  % Missing 
Dependent Variable  W62(65)Pay  0.53            0.50 0 0.24 0.43 0
SAVE  -0.55            5.76 0 -0.80 6.64 0 Shortfalls (X1) 
SAVEDIFF  0.19      0.77 0         
Less than HS  0.20            0.40 0 0.21 0.41 0
More than HS  0.45            0.50 0 0.45 0.50 0
Divorce  0.57            0.50 0 0.57 0.50 0
Widow  0.29            0.45 0 0.31 0.46 0
Children  2.45            1.86 0 2.46 1.92 0
Black  0.17            0.37 0 0.17 0.37 0
Hispanic  0.05            0.22 0 0.05 0.21 0
SES (X1) 
Female  0.66            0.47 0 0.66 0.48 0
Any ADL  0.05            0.23 0 0.06 0.24 0
Health (X1)  Subj. P(Live to 
75)  0.67            0.29 0 0.66 0.29 0
Consume Less  0.47            0.50 0.16 0.46 0.50 0.16 Planning (X2) 
Long Plan  0.37            0.48 0 0.35 0.48 0
Health Shock  0.25            0.43 0.09 0.35 0.48 0.31 Shocks (X3) 
Widow Shock  0.06            0.24 0.01 0.15 0.36 0.20
   Obs  947        787       
Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS. 
 
 
  Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics for Married Respondents by Analysis Sample 
 
 P(Work | 62) Sample   P(Work | 65) Sample 
Respondent        Spouse Respondent Spouse Variable Type  Variable Name 
Mean  Std. Dev  % Missing  Mean  Std. Dev  % Missing  Mean  Std. Dev  Pct. Missing  Mean  Std. Dev  Pct. Missing 
Dep. Variable  W62(65)Pay  0.53                        0.50 0 0.51 0.50 0.12 0.25 0.43 0 0.39 0.49 0.36
SAVE  -0.31  2.92  0           -0.44  3.07  0           Shortfalls (X1) 
SAVEDIFF  0.09  0.30  0                            
Less than HS  0.17                        0.37 0 0.17 0.37 0 0.17 0.38 0 0.17 0.38 0
More than HS  0.44                        0.50 0 0.42 0.49 0 0.42 0.49 0 0.41 0.49 0
Divorce  0.23                        0.42 0 0.21 0.41 0 0.23 0.42 0 0.21 0.41 0
Widow  0.03                        0.17 0 0.04 0.20 0 0.03 0.18 0 0.04 0.20 0
Children  3.42  1.94  0          3.46  1.96  0         
Black  0.06                        0.24 0 0.06 0.24 0 0.06 0.24 0 0.06 0.24 0
Hispanic  0.04                        0.20 0 0.04 0.20 0 0.04 0.20 0 0.04 0.19 0
SES (X1) 
Female  0.41  0.49  0           0.42  0.49  0          
Any ADL  0.04                        0.20 0 0.08 0.26 0 0.04 0.20 0 0.07 0.26 0
Health (X1)  Subj. P(Live to 
75)  0.67                        0.27 0 0.68 0.27 0 0.66 0.28 0 0.67 0.27 0
Consume Less  0.42                        0.49 0.13 0.45 0.50 0.23 0.42 0.49 0.12 0.45 0.50 0.24 Planning (X2) 
Long Plan  0.41                        0.49 0 0.40 0.49 0 0.40 0.49 0 0.39 0.49 0
Health Shock  0.22                        0.41 0.09 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.29 0.45 0.41 Shocks (X3) 
Widow Shock  0.08  0.27  0.01           0.16  0.37  0.22          
   Obs  2900        2900        2425        2425       
Source: Authors’ weighted computations from the HRS. 
 
 
 